Notes, Comments and Preliminary results Mar 10 2021 Ayse Mumcu and Ismail Saglam   Strategic Issues in College Admissions with Early Decision   Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note   Dec 06 2020 Chihiro Morooka   Inefficiency in alternately repeated coordination games with dynastic preferences   Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note   Sep 24 2020 Kim Gannon and Hanzhe Zhang   An Evolutionary Justification for Overconfidence   Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note   Jul 14 2020 Naoki Matsumoto and Masaki Minegishi   Sufficient conditions for the existence of stable sets of cooperative games   Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note   May 15 2020 Brishti Guha   Revisiting the volunteer's dilemma: group size and public good provision in the presence of some ambiguity aversion   Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Preliminary Result   Feb 05 2020 Ismail Saglam   Measuring external stability in one-to-one matching   Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note   Oct 13 2019 Sung-Hoon Park   The gap between equilibrium expected payoffs in contests with linear externalities   Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Preliminary Result   Sep 07 2018 Chaowen Yu , Yuhki Hosoya and Toru Maruyama   On the purification of mixed strategies   Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note   Jul 18 2018 Miyashita Haruki   On a trade-off in the evolution of ownership   Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Comment   May 25 2018 Nikolai S. Kukushkin and Pierre von Mouche   Cournot tatonnement and Nash equilibrium in binary status games   Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note   Sep 27 2017 Yoshimasa Katayama , Satoshi Nakada and Taishi Sassano   Evolutionary Implementation of Efficient Networks   Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note   Jun 05 2017 Nikolai S. Kukushkin   Inseparables: exact potentials and addition   Abstract  Contact Information  Citation  Full Text  -  Note