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Female suffrage and fertility decline: evidence from Swiss Cantons

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Abstract

This paper examines the causal impact of female political emancipation on fertility in Switzerland during the 1970s and 1980s, exploiting the staggered introduction of women's suffrage across cantons. Using a synthetic difference-in-differences (SDID) approach (Arkhangelsky et al., 2021), I estimate the counterfactual fertility trajectories that would have prevailed in the absence of suffrage reforms. The results show a significant decline in fertility rates following female enfranchisement. Cantons that granted women the right to vote experienced an average fertility reduction of 0.42 total fertility rate relative to their synthetic counterparts in the next 20 years after the reform. The findings suggest that female political empowerment reshaped demographic behavior, potentially accelerating Switzerland's demographic transition.

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1. **Introduction**

The extension of political rights to women represents a landmark in the history of social and economic modernization. Yet, despite extensive research on the consequences of female suffrage for public policy and labor market outcomes (Lott and Kenny, 1999; Miller, 2008; Bertocchi, 2011; Aidt and Dallal, 2008), relatively little is known about its demographic effects, particularly on fertility behavior.

This paper investigates whether and how the political emancipation of women affected fertility behavior in mid- and late-twentieth-century Switzerland. Unlike most Western democracies, Switzerland granted women the right to vote relatively late—at the federal level only in 1971—and at the cantonal level in a staggered pattern, with some cantons adopting suffrage as early as the 1950s and others as late as the 1980s (Alesina and Pischke, 2020). This heterogeneity provides quasi-experimental variation that can be exploited to identify the causal effects of female political rights on fertility decisions.

From an economic perspective, female enfranchisement may influence fertility through several channels. First, political participation can strengthen women's bargaining power within households, shifting preferences toward smaller families and higher investments in child quality (Becker, 1981; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). Second, political inclusion may accelerate the diffusion of gender-equality norms and enhance access to female education and employment opportunities (Doepke, Tertilt, and Voena, 2012; Goldin, 2006; Lesthaeghe, 2010). Third, suffrage reform may alter local policy priorities, increasing spending on childcare, education, or health, thereby indirectly affecting fertility choices (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014).

Relative to existing literature, this paper makes three specific contributions. First, while prior studies such as Miller (2008) and Bertocchi (2011) focus primarily on public spending, child health, or welfare-state outcomes, this study provides direct causal evidence on fertility responses to women's political empowerment. Second, it exploits the unusually late and staggered introduction of female suffrage across Swiss cantons, offering a distinct institutional setting compared with earlier enfranchisement episodes in the United States and Europe. Third, methodologically, the paper applies the synthetic difference-in-differences estimator to construct credible counterfactual fertility trajectories, thereby strengthening causal identification in a context with few treated units and staggered adoption.

The analysis reveals a robust and significant decline in fertility rates following female suffrage introduction. The results suggest that women's political empowerment not only shaped policy outcomes but also accelerated the demographic transition in late-industrial Switzerland.

2. Background: The History of Female Suffrage in Switzerland

The extension of political rights to women in Switzerland occurred late compared to other Western democracies. While countries such as Germany, France, and Italy enfranchised women shortly after World War I, Swiss women obtained the right to vote at the federal level only in

1971. This delay reflected the institutional rigidity of Switzerland's direct democracy, where constitutional amendments required approval by a majority of male voters. As a result, progress toward women's political inclusion depended on a series of cantonal referenda rather than centralized legislative action.

The first canton to grant women suffrage was Vaud in 1959, followed by Neuchâtel and Geneva in the early 1960s. Over the following decade, the reform gradually diffused across cantons, culminating in the nationwide acceptance of federal female suffrage in 1971. However, the federal reform did not automatically extend to cantonal and communal elections, where local autonomy remained decisive. Consequently, the timing of women's enfranchisement varied widely across cantons, generating a staggered pattern of political inclusion.

The two cantons in the Appenzell region were notably late in adopting women's suffrage. Appenzell Ausserrhoden extended the right to vote in 1989, while Appenzell Innerrhoden followed only after a 1990 Federal Supreme Court ruling mandated female suffrage at all levels of government. This exceptional delay underscores the persistence of regional heterogeneity in gender norms and institutional change within Switzerland. The resulting temporal and spatial variation in the adoption of women's suffrage provides a valuable natural experiment to study its broader socioeconomic and demographic consequences, including its impact on fertility behavior.

3. Empirical Approach

In this research, due to availability of annual Canton level total fertility rate data, which is available from 1981, I use the two cantons which adopted women's suffrage (Appenzell Ausserrhoden in 1989 and Appenzell Innerrhoden in 1990) as the treated group and other Cantons as the potential donors. To estimate the causal effect of female suffrage on fertility, I employ a synthetic difference-in-differences (DID) framework (Arkhangelsky et al., 2021). This estimator combines elements of both difference-in-differences and synthetic control, allowing for time-varying unobservables and staggered adoption. Also, it can estimate the treatment effect without perfectly matching the treatments and their synthetic control before the treatment, as it only requires the parallel pre-treatment trend. Also, it can incorporate the time-invariant difference between the treatment (Arkhangelsky et al., 2021).

Identification relies on the assumption that, absent the introduction of female suffrage, treated cantons would have followed the same trends as a weighted combination of control cantons. This assumption is plausible in the Swiss context, where the timing of suffrage adoption was largely driven by institutional and political constraints rather than short-run changes in the outcomes studied. The synthetic DID estimator strengthens credibility by explicitly constructing a counterfactual that closely matches pre-treatment trends, thereby reducing concerns about differential trends and unobserved heterogeneity. Consequently, post-reform deviations between treated cantons and their synthetic counterparts can be interpreted as the causal effect of female suffrage.

Let Y_{it} denote the total fertility rate (expected number of births per woman) in canton i and year t. The treatment variable D_{it} equals 1 if female suffrage is newly in effect in canton i at time t. The estimator constructs a synthetic untreated counterfactual for each treated canton, using pre-treatment outcomes and covariates.

The model of Arkhangelsky et al (2021) can be written as:

$$(\hat{\tau}, \hat{\mu}, \hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta}) = argmin\{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (Y_{it} - \mu - \alpha_i - \beta_t - D_{it}\tau)^2\} \hat{w}_i \hat{\lambda}_t\} \qquad (1)$$

where α_i captures canton fixed effects, β_t denotes time shocks common to all cantons, $\hat{w}_i$ and $\hat{\lambda}_t$ are the chosen weight for unit and time. This specification generalizes both the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) and the conventional difference-in-differences (DID) framework. Similar to SCM, it does not employ time weights, and similar to DID, it omits both unit-specific and time-specific weighting schemes. Synthetic DID estimator minimizes the mean squared prediction error in the pre-treatment period to construct synthetic weights for control cantons, providing a counterfactual Y_{it} for the post-treatment period.

4. Data and Variables

Fertility rates are drawn from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office's historical demographic series, providing the total fertility rate estimate annually by canton from 1981. The dependent variable is the total fertility rate (TFR), defined as the expected number of live births per woman during her biological fertile period (age 15 to age 44). It also provides the numbers of marriages and divorces, and canton population estimate each year which are used in additional analysis. Age-specific fertility rates are calculated using data from the same sources. Swiss census data from 1980 to 2000 were collected from IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2025) to examine the mechanism (female employment and education). The timing of cantonal suffrage reforms is taken from official records of the Swiss Federal Chancellery. The author also acknowledges the Switzerland Federal Statistical Office as the original producer of the data.

5. Results

Baseline estimates reveal a statistically significant decline in fertility following the introduction of women's suffrage (Table I and II). On average, treated cantons experienced a reduction in the total fertility rate (TFR) of 0.42 relative to their synthetic controls after enfranchisement. The estimated coefficients range from –0.832 to –0.013 (Appendix Table I). The decline occurred rapidly: within two years of the reform, the TFR had decreased by 0.32, and the downward trend persisted, reaching –0.61 twenty years after the reform. The donor canton weights for Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Appenzell Innerrhoden are reported in Appendix Table II. Figure 1 to 2 further indicate that the parallel trends assumption is well satisfied in the pre-treatment period.

The age-specific fertility rate shows that the decline was concentrated among younger women (under age 30; see Appendix Figure 1 and 2, and Appendix Table VII), with no comparable decline among women aged 30 and above (Appendix Figure 3 to 4, and Appendix Table VIII). Due to data limitations, the adolescent (ages 15–19) fertility rate could not be calculated because the youngest available category is under age 25. However, since fertility among women under 25 does not show a significant decline (see Appendix Figure 5 to 6 and Appendix Table VIIII), the overall decline appears to be concentrated among women in their twenties rather than among adolescents.

6. Mechanisms

To understand the proxy mechanisms of the fertility decline, I have checked whether marriage rate and divorce rate has been influenced by the female suffrage reform. Unfortunately, there is no available Canton level annual data for the marital fertility rate and marriage duration statistic, I use the numbers of marriages and divorces, and canton population estimate, then calculate the marriage rate per 1000 and divorce rate per 1000 as the dependent variables. Figure 3 to 6 and Appendix Table III and VI shows that there was no significant change of marriage rate and the divorce rate after the female suffrage reform. Thus it is likely that the decline of the total fertility rate was driven by the decline of marital fertility rate, not the decline of marriage.

The ultimate mechanisms through which female suffrage affected fertility cannot be fully examined due to data limitations. However, using Swiss Census data from IPUMS, the two cantons show no significant increase in female employment rates or female education levels compared with other cantons (see Appendix Figure 7 to 9 and Appendix Table XI to XII). Therefore, the most plausible explanation is a rapid shift in norms or perceptions related to fertility control following the introduction of female suffrage, which likely drove the observed decline in fertility.

7. Conclusion

This paper provides new evidence on the demographic consequences of women's political empowerment by exploiting the staggered introduction of female suffrage across Swiss cantons. Using a synthetic difference-in-differences approach, I find that enfranchisement led to a significant and sustained decline in fertility rates.

The results underscore that institutional reforms expanding women's rights can have far-reaching implications beyond the political sphere—shaping demographic behavior and accelerating gender equality. Future research could investigate longer-run effects on family structure, labor market outcomes, and intergenerational mobility.

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Figure 1: The impact of Female Suffrage on Total Fertility Rate: Appenzell Ausserrhoden



Figure 2: The impact of Female Suffrage on Total Fertility Rate: Appenzell Innerrhoden



Figure 3: The impact of Female Suffrage on Divorce Rate: Appenzell Ausserrhoden



Figure 4: The impact of Female Suffrage on Divorce Rate: Appenzell Innerrhoden



Figure 5: The impact of Female Suffrage on Marriage Rate: Appenzell Ausserrhoden



Figure 6: The impact of Female Suffrage on Marriage Rate: Appenzell Innerrhoden



Appendix Table I: Estimates of Female Suffrage on Total Fertility Rate

	Estimate	SE	LB CI	UB CI
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)	-0.4226	0.2089	-0.8320	-0.0131
1 Year After Treatment	0.0613	0.0551	-0.0467	0.1693
2 Year After Treatment	-0.3192	0.1853	-0.6823	0.0439
3 Year After Treatment	-0.2572	0.1686	-0.5877	0.0733
4 Year After Treatment	-0.2229	0.1708	-0.5577	0.1118
5 Year After Treatment	-0.3104	0.2436	-0.7879	0.1671
6 Year After Treatment	-0.4397	0.2405	-0.9111	0.0317
7 Year After Treatment	-0.3882	0.2458	-0.8698	0.0935
8 Year After Treatment	-0.3309	0.1596	-0.6436	-0.0181
9 Year After Treatment	-0.4237	0.2363	-0.8869	0.0394
10 Year After Treatment	-0.4290	0.2871	-0.9917	0.1336
11 Year After Treatment	-0.4843	0.2484	-0.9712	0.0025
12 Year After Treatment	-0.4931	0.2162	-0.9168	-0.0694
13 Year After Treatment	-0.3855	0.1741	-0.7267	-0.0443
14 Year After Treatment	-0.5535	0.2271	-0.9986	-0.1084
15 Year After Treatment	-0.5743	0.2226	-1.0106	-0.1380
16 Year After Treatment	-0.5908	0.2455	-1.0719	-0.1096
17 Year After Treatment	-0.6085	0.2407	-1.0803	-0.1368
18 Year After Treatment	-0.5185	0.1730	-0.8576	-0.1794
19 Year After Treatment	-0.5745	0.2077	-0.9817	-0.1674
20 Year After Treatment	-0.5359	0.2547	-1.0350	-0.0367
21 Year After Treatment	-0.6112	0.2547	-1.1104	-0.1120
22 Year After Treatment	-0.1896	0.0900	-0.3660	-0.0132
1 Year Before Treatment	-0.0248	0.1040	-0.2287	0.1791
2 Year Before Treatment	0.0338	0.0804	-0.1238	0.1913
3 Year Before Treatment	0.0127	0.0729	-0.1302	0.1557
4 Year Before Treatment	0.0709	0.0592	-0.0451	0.1868
5 Year Before Treatment	0.0504	0.0582	-0.0637	0.1644
6 Year Before Treatment	0.0396	0.1175	-0.1906	0.2698
7 Year Before Treatment	0.1566	0.0671	0.0251	0.2881
8 Year Before Treatment	0.0284	0.1325	-0.2314	0.2882
9 Year Before Treatment	-0.2184	0.0664	-0.3486	-0.0883

Appendix Table II: Weight of Each Donor Canton for Synthetic Treatment

Donor Canton	Weight for Synthetic Appenzell Ausserrhoden	Weight for Synthetic Appenzell Innerrhoden
Zürich	0.0379	0.0429
Bern	0.0520	0.0000
Luzern	0.0666	0.0753

Uri	0.0534	0.0114
Schwyz	0.0826	0.0905
Obwalden	0.0811	0.0000
Nidwalden	0.0000	0.0000
Glarus	0.0207	0.0886
Zug	0.0542	0.0000
Freiburg	0.0491	0.0208
Solothurn	0.0380	0.0326
Basel-Stadt	0.0484	0.1458
Basel-Landschaft	0.0546	0.1275
Schaffhausen	0.0120	0.0000
St. Gallen	0.0281	0.0112
Graubünden	0.0187	0.0223
Aargau	0.0522	0.0000
Thurgau	0.0336	0.0598
Tessin	0.0496	0.0000
Waadt	0.0000	0.0359
Wallis	0.0487	0.0000
Neuenburg	0.0000	0.0575
Genf	0.0243	0.0953
Jura	0.0943	0.0827

Appendix Table III: Estimates of Female Suffrage on Divorce Rate

	Estimate	SE	LB CI	UB CI
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)	0.0395	0.1600	-0.2740	0.3531
1 Year After Treatment	-0.0169	0.0796	-0.1729	0.1392
2 Year After Treatment	-0.2459	0.1861	-0.6107	0.1188
3 Year After Treatment	0.0779	0.2020	-0.3180	0.4738
4 Year After Treatment	-0.0841	0.0591	-0.1999	0.0317
5 Year After Treatment	-0.0490	0.0575	-0.1618	0.0638
6 Year After Treatment	0.1456	0.1241	-0.0977	0.3889
7 Year After Treatment	-0.0772	0.3983	-0.8580	0.7035
8 Year After Treatment	-0.0091	0.1011	-0.2073	0.1892
9 Year After Treatment	-0.1335	0.6174	-1.3436	1.0766
10 Year After Treatment	-0.1484	0.1052	-0.3547	0.0579
11 Year After Treatment	0.1579	0.1680	-0.1715	0.4872
12 Year After Treatment	0.1415	0.2009	-0.2524	0.5353
13 Year After Treatment	0.1072	0.1496	-0.1861	0.4004
14 Year After Treatment	-0.2120	0.3257	-0.8504	0.4264
15 Year After Treatment	-0.1185	0.4206	-0.9428	0.7058
16 Year After Treatment	0.4846	0.1462	0.1982	0.7711

17 Year After Treatment	0.6418	0.2175	0.2156	1.0681
18 Year After Treatment	-0.0658	0.1656	-0.3903	0.2587
19 Year After Treatment	-0.3351	0.1963	-0.7198	0.0495
20 Year After Treatment	-0.1871	0.2603	-0.6972	0.3230
21 Year After Treatment	0.5392	0.1201	0.3037	0.7746
22 Year After Treatment	0.4733	0.2168	0.0484	0.8982
1 Year Before Treatment	0.0029	0.0483	-0.0918	0.0976
2 Year Before Treatment	-0.0811	0.0760	-0.2300	0.0679
3 Year Before Treatment	-0.0505	0.0714	-0.1903	0.0894
4 Year Before Treatment	-0.0189	0.0573	-0.1313	0.0935
5 Year Before Treatment	-0.0663	0.1029	-0.2680	0.1355
6 Year Before Treatment	0.0385	0.0700	-0.0986	0.1756
7 Year Before Treatment	0.1115	0.1582	-0.1986	0.4215
8 Year Before Treatment	0.0448	0.1337	-0.2174	0.3069
9 Year Before Treatment	-0.0841	0.1119	-0.3034	0.1352

Appendix Table IV: Weight of Each Donor Canton for Synthetic Treatment

Donor Canton	Weight for Synthetic Appenzell Ausserrhoden	Weight for Synthetic Appenzell Innerrhoden
Zürich	0.0460	0.0517
Bern	0.0376	0.0355
Luzern	0.0027	0.0548
Uri	0.0434	0.0000
Schwyz	0.0411	0.0146
Obwalden	0.0000	0.0395
Nidwalden	0.0768	0.0391
Glarus	0.0365	0.0205
Zug	0.1433	0.0062
Freiburg	0.0000	0.0580
Solothurn	0.0160	0.0289
Basel-Stadt	0.0248	0.0328
Basel-Landschaft	0.0880	0.0438
Schaffhausen	0.0542	0.0350
St. Gallen	0.0306	0.0452
Graubünden	0.0286	0.0257
Aargau	0.0777	0.0234
Thurgau	0.0568	0.0657
Tessin	0.0563	0.0918
Waadt	0.0392	0.0713
Wallis	0.0313	0.0419
Neuenburg	0.0000	0.1091
Genf	0.0587	0.0446
Jura	0.0104	0.0209

Appendix Table V: Estimates of Female Suffrage on Marriage Rate

	Estimate	SE	LB CI	UB CI
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)	-0.6395	0.4271	-1.4767	0.1976
1 Year After Treatment	-0.6323	0.4827	-1.5784	0.3138
2 Year After Treatment	-0.1780	0.4727	-1.1044	0.7485
3 Year After Treatment	0.0301	0.2493	-0.4586	0.5188
4 Year After Treatment	-0.8545	0.5390	-1.9109	0.2018
5 Year After Treatment	-0.4474	0.4450	-1.3196	0.4248
6 Year After Treatment	-0.4050	0.1781	-0.7541	-0.0559
7 Year After Treatment	-0.6009	0.4388	-1.4609	0.2590
8 Year After Treatment	-0.6796	0.4969	-1.6536	0.2944
9 Year After Treatment	-0.5719	0.3117	-1.1828	0.0390
10 Year After Treatment	-0.2821	0.3319	-0.9327	0.3685
11 Year After Treatment	-0.7733	0.4305	-1.6170	0.0705
12 Year After Treatment	-1.0206	0.5161	-2.0321	-0.0091
13 Year After Treatment	-1.1181	0.4948	-2.0878	-0.1483
14 Year After Treatment	-1.0522	0.7306	-2.4843	0.3799
15 Year After Treatment	-1.2391	0.3718	-1.9677	-0.5105
16 Year After Treatment	-1.1018	0.4873	-2.0568	-0.1468
17 Year After Treatment	-1.1746	0.6973	-2.5413	0.1921
18 Year After Treatment	-0.4116	0.5415	-1.4729	0.6498
19 Year After Treatment	-0.6031	0.7637	-2.1000	0.8937
20 Year After Treatment	-0.0874	0.1756	-0.4315	0.2568
21 Year After Treatment	-0.5563	0.4857	-1.5083	0.3956
22 Year After Treatment	0.0189	0.1921	-0.3577	0.3954
1 Year Before Treatment	0.0973	0.6006	-1.0799	1.2745
2 Year Before Treatment	-0.8794	0.2402	-1.3502	-0.4087
3 Year Before Treatment	-0.1232	0.3272	-0.7644	0.5181
4 Year Before Treatment	-0.3913	0.1758	-0.7358	-0.0468
5 Year Before Treatment	-0.3090	0.4086	-1.1098	0.4918
6 Year Before Treatment	0.4675	0.7089	-0.9220	1.8570
7 Year Before Treatment	-0.4071	0.3973	-1.1859	0.3717
8 Year Before Treatment	0.2015	0.1609	-0.1138	0.5169
9 Year Before Treatment	-0.0951	0.1502	-0.3895	0.1992

Appendix Table VI: Weight of Each Donor Canton for Synthetic Treatment

Donor Canton	Weight for Synthetic Appenzell Ausserrhoden	Weight for Synthetic Appenzell Innerrhoden
Zürich	0.0440	0.0191
Bern	0.0286	0.0389
Luzern	0.0583	0.0823
Uri	0.0128	0.1038
Schwyz	0.1206	0.1230
Obwalden	0.0292	0.0000
Nidwalden	0.0679	0.0431
Glarus	0.0561	0.1159
Zug	0.0429	0.0406
Freiburg	0.0000	0.0000
Solothurn	0.0200	0.0000
Basel-Stadt	0.0784	0.0000
Basel-Landschaft	0.0000	0.0000
Schaffhausen	0.0821	0.0000
St. Gallen	0.0371	0.0590
Graubünden	0.0625	0.0620
Aargau	0.0321	0.0471
Thurgau	0.0461	0.0681
Tessin	0.0248	0.0212
Waadt	0.0042	0.0000
Wallis	0.0484	0.0172
Neuenburg	0.0000	0.0000
Genf	0.0442	0.0685
Jura	0.0597	0.0903

Appendix Figure 1: The Impact of Female Suffrage on Births per 1000 Women (Younger than Age 30, Appenzell Ausserrhoden)



Appendix Figure 2: The Impact of Female Suffrage on Births per 1000 Women (Younger than Age 30, Appenzell Innerrhoden)



Appendix Table VII: The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for Births per 1000 Women (Younger than Age 30)

	ATT	SE	t	p-value	LB CI	UB CI
Treatment	-15.4827	4.6825	-3.31	0.001	-24.6602	-6.3053

Appendix Figure 3: The Impact of Female Suffrage on Births per 1000 Women (Age 30 or Older, Appenzell Ausserrhoden)



Appendix Figure 4: The Impact of Female Suffrage on Births per 1000 Women (Age 30 or Older, Appenzell Innerrhoden)



Appendix Table VIII: The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for Births per 1000 Women (Age 30 or Older)

	ATT	SE	t	p-value	LB CI	UB CI
Treatment	-11.2934	9.9047	-1.14	0.254	-30.7063	8.1195

Appendix Figure 5: The Impact of Female Suffrage on Births per 1000 Women (Younger than Age 25. Appenzell Ausserrhoden)



Appendix Figure 6: The Impact of Female Suffrage on Births per 1000 Women (Younger than Age 25. Appenzell Innerrhoden)



Appendix Table IX: The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for Births per 1000 Women (Younger than Age 25)

	ATT	SE	t	p-value	LB CI	UB CI
Treatment	-4.0020	3.7955	-1.05	0.292	-11.4410	3.4371

Appendix Figure 7: The Impact of Female Suffrage on Female Employment Rate (Age 25 or Older)



Appendix Table X: The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for Female Employment Rate (Age 25 or Older)

	ATT	SE	t	p-value	LB CI	UB CI
Treatment	-0.0530	0.0882	-0.60	0.548	-0.2258	0.1198

Appendix Figure 8: The Impact of Female Suffrage on Female Upper Secondary Graduated or Higer Share (Age 25 or Older)



Appendix Table XI: The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) Female Upper Secondary Graduated or Higer Share (Age 25 or Older)

	ATT	SE	t	p-value	LB CI	UB CI
Treatment	-0.0576	0.0999	-0.58	0.564	-0.2535	0.1382

Appendix Figure 9: The Impact of Female Suffrage on Female Post Secondary Graduated or Higer Share (Age 25 or Older)



Appendix Table XII: The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) Female Post Secondary Graduated or Higer Share (Age 25 or Older)

	ATT	SE	t	p-value	LB CI	UB CI
Treatment	-0.0220	0.0358	-0.62	0.538	-0.0922	0.0481