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| Meixing Dai |
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| ''Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness'' |
| ( 2010, Vol. 30 No.3 ) |
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| This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering the optimal choice of central bank conservativeness. It is shown that the government can choose a sufficiently populist but opaque central banker so that higher multiplicative uncertainty improves the social welfare only when the society is very conservative. |
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| Keywords: Multiplicative uncertainty; optimal degree of conservativeness; Brainard conservatism; central bank transparency. |
JEL: E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
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| Manuscript Received : Apr 26 2010 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jul 06 2010 |
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