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| Harold Houba and Quan Wen |
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| ''On The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States'' |
| ( 2006, Vol. 3 No.3 ) |
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| Slantchev (2003, American Political Science Review, 97) studies a class of negotiation models to explain costly conflict between two completely informed nations. In one of his main propositions (Proposition 2.3), Slantchev provides a strategy profile to support the so-called extremal subgame perfect equilibrium, where one nation receives its lowest equilibrium payoff. By means of a counter example, we demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium with one nation's payoffs below the strategy profile provided in his Proposition 2.3 (Case 2). |
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| Manuscript Received : Dec 22 2005 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jan 25 2006 |
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