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| Pietro Navarra and Ram Mudambi |
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| ''Divisional power, intra-firm bargaining and rent-seeking behavior in multidivisional corporations'' |
| ( 2004, Vol. 4 No.13 ) |
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| Increasing divisional operational responsibilities and the dispersal of knowledge creating activities within the firm have loosened the traditional hierarchical structure of multi-divisional firms. In this paper we argue that a similar mixture of competition and cooperation that is found in inter-firm relationships now characterizes intra-firm relationships. Our model describes a situation in which divisional managers have their own objectives that may diverge from those of the firm as a whole.Thus, divisional managers are both profit-seekers in creating value that can be appropriated and rent-seekers in attempting to maximize their divisional share of the value d by the firm. The bargaining power of a division to maintain and increase its share of the profits generated by the operations of the firm as whole is crucially determined on its strategic independence. |
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| Keywords: |
JEL: D2 - Production and Organizations: General
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| Manuscript Received : Jul 28 2004 | | Manuscript Accepted : Sep 24 2004 |
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