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| Dripto Bakshi |
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| ''Rawlsian welfare implications of endogenous transfers in a network of bilateral contests'' |
| ( 2025, Vol. 45 No.3 ) |
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| This paper explores the Rawlsian welfare implications of endogenous transfers in a three- player- system where one player fights the other two bilaterally. Though such transfers can be welfare improving under certain conditions (explicitly mentioned in the paper), Rawlsian welfare maximization cannot be achieved endogenously via transfers. The welfare maximizing distribution is stable i.e immune to endogenous transfers. |
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| Keywords: Conflict Economics, Game Theory, Endogenous Transfers, Rawlsian Welfare |
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D6 - Welfare Economics: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Jul 26 2024 | | Manuscript Accepted : Sep 30 2025 |
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