Luciana C Moscoso Boedo and Antonio Jimenez-Martinez   ''Identifying defectors in a population with short-run players.'' ( 2015, Vol. 35 No.2 )     This paper considers a repeated Prisoner’s' Dilemma game to explore how an information mechanism that labels defectors can help sustain cooperation in societies that include short-run players. We provide sufficient conditions under which there exists equilibria that sustain cooperation for different information technologies that identify defectors. We also analyze imperfect labeling mechanisms.     Keywords: short-run players, population game, labeling mechanism JEL: D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General   Manuscript Received : Jun 26 2012   Manuscript Accepted : Jun 09 2015   This abstract has been downloaded 1858 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 192006 times