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| Nizar Allouch and Myrna Wooders |
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| ''On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games'' |
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| We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be approximated by equal-treatment ε-cores of the games themselves. Our proof is novel in that we rely on a fixed point theorem. |
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| Keywords: NTU games, core, approximate cores, small group effectiveness, coalition formation, payoff dependent balancedness. |
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
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| Manuscript Received : Oct 20 2014 | | Manuscript Accepted : Nov 03 2014 |
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