Inaugural Conference of the Chinese Game Theory and ExperimentalEconomics Association Day 1 (August 24, 2010)   Date/Time Location Type Title Papers 1 August 24, 08:25-09:30 Ningyuan 528 plenary   1 2 August 24, 09:50-11:50 Ningyuan 528 Contributed 1-A 4 3 August 24, 09:50-11:50 Ningyuan 534 Contributed 1-B 4 4 August 24, 09:50-11:50 Ningyuan 303 Contributed 1-C 4 Lunch time (Ningyuan 532) 5 August 24, 12:15-13:15 Ningyuan 309 poster 1-0   6 August 24, 13:15-14:15 Ningyuan 528 plenary   1   7 August 24, 14:20-15:50 Ningyuan 528 Contributed 2-A 3 8 August 24, 14:20-15:50 Ningyuan 534 Contributed 2-B 3 9 August 24, 14:20-15:50 Ningyuan 303 Contributed 2-C 3   10 August 24, 16:00-17:30 Ningyuan 528 Contributed 3-A 3 11 August 24, 16:00-17:30 Ningyuan 534 Contributed 3-B 3 12 August 24, 16:00-17:30 Ningyuan 303 Contributed 3-C 3 Day 2 (August 25, 2010) 13 August 25, 08:30-10:00 Ningyuan 528 Contributed 4-A 3 14 August 25, 08:30-10:00 Ningyuan 534 Contributed 4-B 3 15 August 25, 08:30-10:00 Ningyuan 303 Contributed 4-C 3 16 August 25, 08:30-10:00 Ningyuan 306 Contributed 4-D 3   17 August 25, 10:15-11:45 Ningyuan 528 Contributed 5-A 3 18 August 25, 10:15-11:45 Cancelled - 5-B - 19 August 25, 10:15-11:45 Ningyuan 303 Contributed 5-C 3 20 August 25, 10:15-11:45 Ningyuan 306 Contributed 5-D 3 21 August 25, 10:15-11:45 Ningyuan 307 Contributed 5-E 3 11:45-12:15 Lunch time (Ningyuan 532) 22 August 25, 12:15-13:15 Ningyuan 309 poster 2-0   23 August 25, 13:15-14:15 Ningyuan 528 plenary   1   24 August 25, 14:20-15:50 Ningyuan 528 Contributed 6-A 3 25 August 25, 14:20-15:50 Ningyuan 534 Contributed 6-B 3 26 August 25, 14:20-15:50 Ningyuan 303 Contributed 6-C 3 27 August 25, 14:20-15:50 Ningyuan 306 Contributed 6-D 3   28 August 25, 16:00-17:30 Ningyuan 528 Contributed 7-A 3 29 August 25, 16:00-17:30 Ningyuan 534 Contributed 7-B 3 30 August 25, 16:00-17:30 Ningyuan 303 Contributed 7-C 3 31 August 25, 16:00-17:30 Ningyuan 306 Contributed 7-D 3 32 August 25, 16:00-17:30 Ningyuan 307 Contributed 7-E 3   33 August 25, 17:35-18:35 Ningyuan 528 plenary   1 l       Coffeebreaks and lunches will be provided at Ningyuan 532 l       Chartedshuttle bus pickups at both CATIC and Purple Jade Laguna hotels to the conferencevenue depart exactly by 8:00AM on 24 and 25 August. Bus pickup from Purple JadeLaguna hotel for welcome dinner (to be held in Grand CATIC Skylight Hotel) on23 August departs by 18:00PM.     Plenary Sessions: 1, Matthew Jackson (Stanford University),Repeated Games and Favor Exchange on Social Networks, August 24,08:30-09:30 2, Martin Shubik (Yale University), The Present and Future of Game Theory, August 24, 13:15-14:15 3, Shmuel Zamir (The Hebrew Universityof Jerusalem), The Condorcet JuryTheorem: the Dependent Case, August 25, 13:15-14:15 4, WilliamThomson (University of Rochester),On the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims, August 25, 17:35-18:35           Day 1 (August 24, 2010) 08:25-08:30 Wang Tongsan (Director, Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economics, Chinese  Academy of Social Sciences) Opening Address   Session:plenary Session Chair: Cheng-zhongQin Time: 08:30-09:30AM August 24 Location: Ningyuan 528   08:30-09:30 Matthew Jackson (Stanford University) Repeated Games and Favor Exchange on Social Networks   Session1-A: Solutions (I) Session Chair: YukihikoFunaki Date: August 24 Time: 09:50-11:50 Location: Ningyuan 528   09:50-10:20 By Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University, and Boram Park, Seoul National University，kawa22@snu.ac.kr Fair-ranking properties of a core selection and the Shapley value 10:20-10:50 By Theo Driessen, University of Twente，t.s.h.driessen@ewi.utwente.nl   On the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games 10:50-11:20 By Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University, funaki@waseda.jp，Takumi Kongo, Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University, Rodica Branzei, Alexandru Ioan Cuza'' University and Stef Tijs Tilburg University   A Non-cooperative and an Axiomatic Characterization of the AL-value 11:20-11:50 By Genjiu Xu, Northwestern Polytechnical University, xugenjiu@nwpu.edu.cn，Hui Wang, Northwestern Polytechnical University, and Hao Sun, Northwestern Polytechnical University Matrix analysis for the Owen value   Session1-B: IO I Session Chair: Shigeo Muto Date: August 24 Time: 09:50-11:50 Location: Ningyuan 534   09:50-10:20 By Ferenc Szidarovszky  szidar@sie.arizona.edu, and Feiyue Wang, Systems and Industrial Engineering Department University of ArizonaTucson, Arizona Oligopoly Models 10:20-10:50 By Antonio J Morales, Universidad de Malaga amorales@uma.es, and LINEEX, Miguel A Melendez-jimenez, Universidad de Malaga, and Ana Lozano-vivas, Universidad de Malaga Branching deregulation and merger optimality 10:50-11:20 By Shigeo Muto, Tokyo Institute of Technology, muto@soc.titech.ac.jp ; and Shin Kishimoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology Fee versus royalty policy in licensing through bargaining: An application of the Nash bargaining solution 11:20-11:50 By Marius-ionut Ochea, CentER, Dept. of Economics, Tilburg University  m.i.ochea@uvt.nl On the Stability of the Cournot Solution: An Evolutionary Approach   Session1-C: Social Choice I Session Chair: Maurice Salles Date: August 24 Time: 09:50-11:50 Location: Ningyuan 303   09:50-10:20 By Ming Li, Concordia University mingli@alcor.concordia.ca and Arianna Degan University of Quebec at Montreal Fuzzy Political Campaigns 10:20-10:50 By Rene Van den brink, Department of Econometrics jrbrink@feweb.vu.nl and Tinbergen Institute, Free University Amsterdam and Frank Steffen, University of Liverpool. Axiomatizations of a positional power score and measure for hierarchies 10:50-11:20 By Leon Petrosyan, St. Petersburg University spbuoasis7@peterlink.ru,  David w. k. Yeung, Hong Kong Shue Yan University and Anna v. Iljina, St. Petersburg University. The Detalization of the Irrational Behavior Proof Condition for the Emission Reduction Game 11:20-11:50 By Vladimir Mazalov, Institute of Applied Mathematical Research vmazalov@krc.karelia.ru and Yulia Tokareva, Zabaikalsky State Humanitarian Pedagogical University. Bargaining Models with Arbitration Committee (withdrawn)   Session:Posters I Date: August 24 Time: 12:15-13:15 Location: Ningyuan 309   12:15-13:15 By Yi Xue, school of international trade and economics, University of international business and economics yxue_uibe@163.com; and Ramazan Gencay, Simon Fraser University Trading Frequency and Volatility Clustering 12:15-13:15 By Mingfei Li, Bentley University, mli@bentley.edu Strategies in Repeated Plays ---Expert Selection Problem 12:15-13:15 By Zemin Zhong, HSBC School of Business, Peking University, zzmypster@gmail.com and Fangfang Tang, National School of Development, Peking University Myopia in Contest: Accumulating Valuation All-Pay Auction Model and Experiment 12:15-13:15 By Takuya Sekiguchi, Tokyo Institute of Technology , sekiguchi.t.ag@m.titech.ac.jp Evolutionary game theoretical analysis of persistence of discrepancy between attitude and behavior 12:15-13:15 By John Wu, Business School, East China Normal University, jwugse@gmail.com   Strategic Correlativity in Games 12:15-13:15 By Artem Sedakov, St. Petersburg University, formail@list.ru and Leon Petrosyan, St. Petersburg University Time-consistent solutions in dynamic network games   Session:plenary Session Chair: JingangZhao Date: August 24 Time: 13:15-14:15 Location: Ningyuan 528   13:15-14:15 Martin Shubik (Yale University) The Present and Future of Game Theory   Session2-A: Solutions (II) Session Chair: Chih Chang Date: August 24 Time: 14:20-15:50 Location: Ningyuan 528   14:20-14:50 By Yan-an Hwang  Department of Mathematics, National Dong Hwa University, yahwang@mail.ndhu.edu.tw Marginal monotonicity solution of NTU games 14:50-15:20 By Rene Van den brink, Department of Econometrics ychun@snu.ac.kr  and Tinbergen Institute, Free University Amsterdam and Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems 15:20-15:50 By Chih Chang, National Tsing Hua University, cchang@math.nthu.edu.tw On the coincidence property   Session2-B: Repeated Games Session Chair: Bo Chen Date: August 24 Time: 14:20-15:50 Location: Ningyuan 534   14:20-14:50 By Bo Chen, Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, bochen@smu.edu and Satoru Takahashi, Department of Economics, Princeton University A Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Unequal Discounting 14:50-15:20 By Julio Gonzalez-diaz, University of Santiago de Compostela julio.gonzalez@usc.es and Joyee Deb, New York University Repeated anonymous random matching games: community enforcement beyond the prisoner's dilemma 15:20-15:50 By Brett Graham, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics, bgraham@xmu.edu.cn and Yafeng Wang, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics Optimal yardstick rules under infinitely repeated competition   Session2-C: Information and Incentives Session Chair: Chenghu Ma Date: August 24 Time: 14:20-15:50 Location: Ningyuan 303   14:20-14:50 By Chenghu Ma, School of Management, Fudan University, machenghu@fudan.edu.cn and Jiankang Zhang, Carleton University Aggregation and (Constrained) Optimal Risk Sharing Rule in Incomplete Market 14:50-15:20 By Pinghan Liang, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, liang.pinghan@gmail.com Transfer of authority within hierarchy 15:20-15:50 By Jung You, Rice University, jsyou@rice.edu Envy-free and incentive compatible division of a commodity   Session3-A: Rationality I Session Chair: Ziv Hellman Date: August 24 Time: 16:00-17:30 Location: Ningyuan 528   16:00-16:30 By Yiqing Xing, China Center for Economic Research, Peking University  xingyq@gmail.com  Learning the new from reviewing the familiar   16:30-17:00 By Ziv Hellman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, ziv.hellman@mail.huji.ac.il Almost common priors 17:00-17:30 By Alia Gizatulina, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, gizatulina@coll.mpg.de  and Martin Hellwig, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Payoffs Can be Inferred From Beliefs, Generically, When Beliefs Are Conditioned on Information   Session3-B: Coalitional Games I Session Chair: David Wettstein Date: August 24 Time: 16:00-17:30 Location: Ningyuan 534   16:00-16:30 By Jonathan Newton, University of Cambridge, jcsn2@cam.ac.uk Coalitional Stochastic Stability 16:30-17:00 By David Wettstein, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, wettstn@bgu.ac.il Peter Borm, Tilburg University and Yuan Ju York University Bargaining, Values and Implementation with Coalitional Externalities 17:00-17:30 By Fabien Lange, Keleti Faculty of Economics fabien.lange@kgk.uni-obuda.hu  and László A. Kóczy, Keleti Faculty of Economics Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions   Session3-C: Matching Session Chair: Yuichiro Kamada Date: August 24 Time: 16:00-17:30 Location: Ningyuan 303   16:00-16:30 By Yusuke Narita, University of Tokyo, allofsudden@gmail.com and Kentaro Tomoeda, Harvard University and University of Tokyo Equitability in Matching Market Design with an Application to School Choice 16:30-17:00 By Yuichiro Kamada, Harvard University, ykamada@fas.harvard.edu and Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University Improving Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of Japanese Resident Matching Program 17:00-17:30 By Takumi Kongo, Waseda University kongo_takumi@toki.waseda.jp Unanimity, Strategy-proofness, and Non-bossiness in Two-sided Matching Problems     Day 2 (August 25, 2010)         Session4-A: Coalitional Games II Session Chair: Yuntong Wang Date: August 25 Time: 08:30-10:00 Location: Ningyuan 528   08:30-09:00 By Guixia Guo, Peking University, guoguixia@gmail.com  Baomin Dong, University of International Business and Economics, and Yuntong Wang, University of Windsor Highway toll pricing 09:00-09:30 By Yuntong Wang, University of Windsor, yuntong@uwindsor.ca  and Hu Lu Health Canada Efficient allocation of water with incomplete information 09:30-10:00 By Lina Mallozzi, Univeristy of Naples Federico II mallozzi@unina.it and Stef H. Tijs, University of Tilburg Partial cooperative equilibrium models and applications to international environmental agreements     Session4-B: Bargaining Session Chair: Duozhe Li Date: August 25 Time: 08:30-10:00 Location: Ningyuan 534   08:30-09:00 By Toshiji Miyakawa, Osaka University of Economicstoshiji.miyakawa@gmail.com Noncooperative Foundation of Nash Bargaining Solution in n-Person Games with Incomplete Information 09:00-09:30 By Duozhe Li, Chinese University of Hong Kong, duozheli@cuhk.edu.hk One-to-Many Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol 09:30-10:00 By Shin Kishimoto, Tokyo Institute of Technologykishimoto.s.aa@m.titech.ac.jp An NTU game approach to patent licensing: stable bargaining outcomes under two licensing policies   Session4-C: Experimental I Session Chair: Mamuro Kaneko Date: August 25 Time: 08:30-10:00 Location: Ningyuan 303   08:30-09:00 By Mamoru Kaneko，University of Tsukuba, Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences, kaneko@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp  Ai Takeuchi, Waseda University, Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University and J. Jude Kline, University of Queensland An Experimental Study from the Perspective of Inductive Game Theory 09:00-09:30 By Binglin Gong, Fudan University blgong@fudan.edu.cn  and Chunlei Yang, Academia Sinica Reputation and Cooperation: An Experiment on Prisoner's Dilemma with Second-order Information 09:30-10:00 By Enrique Fatas, University of Valencia , fatas@uv.es  Jordi Brandts, Universitat Autónoma Barcelona and David J Cooper, Florida State University Stand by Me Help, Heterogeneity and Commitment in Experimental Coordination Games   Session4-D: Bayesian Games Session Chair: Cheng-zhong Qin Date: August 25 Time: 08:30-10:00 Location: Ningyuan 306   08:30-09:00 By Cheng-zhong Qin, University of California at Santa Barbara, qin@econ.ucsb.edu and Chun-lei Yang, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan An Explicit Approach to Modeling Finite-Order Type Spaces and Applications 09:00-09:30 By Shinji Kobayashi, Nihon University, kobayashi.shinji@nihon-u.ac.jp and Shigemi Oba, Nihon University Contracting with multiple agents, countervailing incentives, and industry structures 09:30-10:00 By Takahiro Watanabe, Tokyo Metropolitan University contact_nabe08@nabenavi.net and Hideaki Yamashita, Tokyo Metropolitan University Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in Markov games with strategic complementarities for finite actions and finite states   Session5-A: Coalition and Efficiency Session Chair: Jingang Zhao Date: August 25 Time: 10:15-11:45 Location: Ningyuan 528   10:15-10:45 By Jingang Zhao, University of Saskatchewan j.zhao@usask.ca Estimating the Costs of Forming a Coalition: Methodology and the Case of the 1887-1914 Sugar Monopoly 10:45-11:15 By Kwan koo Yun, SUNY at Albany, yun@albany.edu The Motzkin's theorem and Pareto improving reforms 11:15-11:45 By Zhigang Cao and Xiaoguang Yang Academy of Mathematics and System Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences cullencao@gmail.com Vector Games   Session5-B: Social Choice II (Cancelled)   Session5-C: Collective Decision Theory Session Chair: Chenghu Ma Date: August 25 Time: 10:15-11:45 Location: Ningyuan 303   10:15-10:45 By Yongqin Wang, CCES, School of Economics, Fudan University and Te Bao CeNDEF, University of Amsterdam. yongqin_wang@yahoo.com.cn Incomplete Contract and Divisional Structures 10:45-11:15 By Zhiwei Cui, Beihang University cuizhiwei82@yahoo.com.cn The evolution of bilateral free trade agreement networks 11:15-11:45 By Chen Cheng, China Center for Economic Research PKU chencheng.ccer@gmail.com A Game Theoretic Analysis of China's Ongoing Land Institutional Change   Session5-D: IO II Session Chair: Andrey Garnaev Date: August 25 Time: 10:15-11:45 Location: Ningyuan 306   10:15-10:45 By Zhengzheng Pan, Virginia Tech, zzpan@vt.edu and Robert P. Gilles, Queen's University, Belfast Naive learning and game play in a dual social network framework 10:45-11:15 By Andrey Garnaev, Saint Petersburg State University garnaev@yahoo.com How to set tariff 11:15-11:45 By Mario Gilli, Department of Economics - University of Milan-Bicocca mario.gilli@unimib.it Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory model   Session5-E IO III Session Chair: Adam Wong Date: August 25 Time: 10:15-11:45 Location: Ningyuan 307   10:15-10:45 By Jose Vila, University of Valencia, jose.e.vila@uv.es Amparo Urbano, Universidad de Valencia, and Angel Sanchez, University Carlos III de Madrid Multidimensional Connectivity and Cooperation 10:45-11:15 By Bach Ha, Northwestern University, bach@u.northwestern.edu    Hai Zhou, Northwestern University haizhou@eecs.northwestern.edu Computational complexity of sequential pricing on social networks 11:15-11:45 By Chi leung (adam) Wong Shanghai University of Finance and Economics wongchileung@gmail.com The choice of the number of varieties: justifying simple mechanisms   Session:Posters II Date: August 25 Time: 12:15-13:15 Location: Ningyuan 309   12:15-13:15 By Jiang Dianyu, Huaihai Institute of Technologyjiangdianyu425@126.com Situation distribution in a 3-Person game in form k(2b-2,2b-1,2b) and the game of 3 players gambling coins 12:15-13:15 By Ryota Iijima, Graduate School of Economics, the University of Tokyo, iijimaaa@gmail.com Impact of Matching Uncertainty on Dynamic Stability of Equilibria 12:15-13:15 By Ming Yang, Dept. of Economics, Princeton Universitymingyang@princeton.edu Global games with endogenous information structure----a rational inattention approach 12:15-13:15 By Gabriel Julio Turbay, Former Research Director UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO  gt.gabrielturbay@gmail.com The stronger player paradox           12:15-13:15 By Oleg Nikonov, Ural State Technical University-UPI, aspr@mail.ustu.ru and Marina Medvedeva Ural State Technical University-UPI On the non-traditional problems of portfolio theory 12:15-13:15 By Fan Wu, University of Magdeburg, Birgitta Wolff, University of Magdeburg, fan.wu@ww.uni-magdeburg.de and Silke Nagel, AOK Sachsen-Anhalt Money, fame, or just for the sake of it: a real-effort experiment on incentives for employee participation   Session:plenary Session Chair: Chenghu Ma Date: August 25 Time: 13:15-14:15 Location: Ningyuan 528   13:15-14:15 Shmuel Zamir (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) The Condorcet Jury Theorem: the Dependent Case,     Session6-A: Experimental II Session Chair: Tatsuyoshi Saijo Date: August 25 Time: 14:20-15:50 Location: Ningyuan 528   14:20-14:50   By Emiko Fukuda, National Defense Academy of Japan, emiko@nda.ac.jp Yoshio Kamijo, Ai Takeuchi, Waseda University, Michiharu Masui, Tokyo Institute of Technology and Yukihiko Funaki Waseda University. Theoretical and experimental investigation of performance of keyword auction mechanisms 14:50-15:20   By Mingli Zheng, Univeristy of Macau mlzheng@umac.mo Reward distribution within a wining team   15:20-15:50 By Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Osaka University and UCLA tatsuyoshisaijo@gmail.com A Solution to Prisoner's Dilemma: 100% Cooperation in the Experiment with Approval Stage     Session6-B: Coalitional Games IV Session Chair: Yuan Ju Date: August 25 Time: 14:20-15:50 Location: Ningyuan 534   14:20-14:50   By Xu Tan, Stanford University, xutan@stanford.edu  and Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer, Stanford University Over-Investments in Networked Market 14:50-15:20   By Yuan Ju, University of York  yj506@york.ac.uk Tolerable extreme and efficient compromise in negotiation with binary choice 15:20-15:50 By Anna Khmelnitskaya, St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences, a.khmelnitskaya@math.utwente.nl and Dolf Talman, Tilburg University Values for cycle-free directed graph games   Session6-C: Networks Session Chair: Rudolf Müller Date: August 25 Time: 14:20-15:50 Location: Ningyuan 303   14:20-14:50   By Jihong Lee, Yonsei university, jihong.lee@yonsei.ac.kr and Syngjoo Choi, University College London Communication, coordination and networks 14:50-15:20   By Ivan Arribas, University of Valencia, ivan.arribas@uv.es and José E Vila, University of Valencia jose.e.vila@uv.es Strategic guanxi behavior in Chinese entrepreneurs: a network approach 15:20-15:50 By Rudolf Müller, Maastricht University, r.muller@maastrichtuniversity.nl Jiwoong Lee, Maastricht University, and Dries Vermeulen, Maastricht University Characterization of Separating Equilibria in a Signaling Game with a Continuum of Types: A Network Approach   Session6-D: Rationality II Session Chair: Ori Haimanko Date: August 25 Time: 14:20-15:50 Location: Ningyuan 306   14:20-14:50   By Ori Haimanko， Ben-Gurion University，orih@bgu.ac.il  Ezra Einy， Ben-Gurion University, and Biligbaatar Tumendemberel, SUNY at Stony Brook Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change   14:50-15:20   By Te Bao, CeNDEF, School of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, t.bao@uva.nl Cars Hommes, Joep Sonnemans and Jan Tuinstra University of Amsterdam Individual Expectation, Limited Rationality and Aggregate Outcomes 15:20-15:50 By Yongchao Zhang, National Univ. Singapore yongchao@nus.edu.sg and Jianwei Wang, Univ. Science and Tech. China Purification, Saturation and the Exact Law of Large Numbers   Session7-A: Auctions and Contests Session Chair: Qian Jiao Date: August 25 Time: 16:00-17:30 Location: Ningyuan 528   16:00-16:30 By Zemin Zhong, HSBC School of Business, Peking University, zzmypster@gmail.com and Fangfang Tang, National School of Development, Peking University Myopia in Contest: Accumulating Valuation All-Pay Auction Model and Experiment 16:30-17:00 By Jason Shachat, WISE, Xiamen University jason.shachat@gmail.com and J. Todd Swarthout, Georgia State University Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games: the impact on equilibrium selection, strategic uncertainty and the structure of social preferences 17:00-17:30 By Qian Jiao, National University of Singapore jiao_qian@nus.edu.sg  and Qiang Fu and Jingfeng Lu, National University of Singapore Contest design with endogenous entry: Disclosure of number of contestants and choice of contest technology   Session7-B: Nash Program Session Chair: Hans Peters Date: August 25 Time: 16:00-17:30 Location: Ningyuan 534   16:00-16:30 By Jonathan Newton, University of Cambridge jcsn2@cam.ac.uk Non-cooperative convergence to the core in Nash demand games without random errors or convexity assumptions 16:30-17:00 By Hans Peters, Maastricht University H.Peters@maastrichtuniversity.nl Non-cooperative approaches to claims or bankruptcy problems 17:00-17:30 By Gabriel Julio Turbay, Former Research Director Universidad Del Rosariogt.gabrielturbay@gmail.com N-person cooperative games strategic-equilibrium   Session7-C:  IO and Behavioral Session Chair: Qiang Fu Date: August 25 Time: 16:00-17:30 Location: Ningyuan 303   16:00-16:30 By Xiaojian Zhao, University of Mannheim scalare0617@hotmail.com and Roberta Dessi, Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ and IDEI) and CEP Self-Esteem, Shame and Personal Motivation 16:30-17:00 By Jie Zheng, Washington University in St. Louis jzheng@artsci.wustl.edu Can Forgetfullness Make Us Better Off? 17:00-17:30 By Qiang Fu, National University of Singapore bizfq@nus.edu.sg  and Ming Li, Concordia University. Policy Making with Reputation Concerns   Session 7-D: Solutions III Session Chair: Marina Nunez Date: August 25 Time: 16:00-17:30 Location: Ningyuan 306 16:00-16:30 By Irinel Chiril Dragan, University of Texas, dragan@uta.edu On the computation of the Shapley Value 16:30-17:00 By Marina Nunez, University of Barcelona, mnunez@ub.edu  and Carles Rafels, Universitat de Barcelona Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market 17:00-17:30 By Sonja Brangewitz, Bielefeld University sonja.brangewitz@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de  and Jan-Philip Gamp,  Bielefeld University Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU Market Games- An extension of the Results of Qin（1993）   Session7-E: Late submissions Session Chair: Date: August 25 Time: 16:00-17:30 Location: Ningyuan 307   16:00-16:30 By Anindya Bhattacharya, University of York, ab51@york.ac.uk  and Victoria Brosi, University of York An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form 16:30-17:00 Carles Rafels, University of Barcelona, crafels@ub.edu  Javier   Martinez de albeniz University of Barcelona, Marina Nunez, University of Barcelona Assignment markets with the same core 17:00-17:30 By Li Fei Univerisity of Pennsylvania fei@sas.upenn.edu Experimentation in an equilibrium labor market with Directed On-the-job Search   Session:plenary Session Chair: YoungsubChun Date: August 25 Time: 17:35-18:35 Location: Ningyuan 528 17:35-18:35 William Thomson (University of Rochester) On the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims Day 3 (August 26, 2010): Post Conferenceday tours.