Volume 35, Issue 4

How do Muslims qua Muslims integrate in the US?

Claire L. Adida
University of California, San Diego

David D. Laitin
Stanford University

Marie-Anne Valfort
Paris School of Economics - Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne University

Abstract

Economic research on immigrant integration highlights the discrimination that Muslim immigrants from Muslim-majority countries face in Western labor markets. However, economists struggle to determine whether this is due to these immigrants' religion or simply their region of origin. Our objective is to isolate the religious effect from potential confounds in the context of Muslim integration in the United States. Relying on a unique survey conducted in metropolitan Detroit which allows us to hold the region of origin of the immigrant constant (Arab countries) while allowing for variation in religion (Christian versus Muslim), we investigate how Muslims qua Muslims integrate in the US relative to Christians. The data reveal that Muslim Arabs are more likely to experience disrespect, to report on media bias against them, and to fare less well in the labour market than do Arab American Christians. Moreover, the Muslim Arabs develop fewer social ties in their host country society and retain closer ties to their home country than do their Christian counterparts. Finally, the gaps in integration remain (and even widen) with the time these immigrants spend in the U.S

Economics Bulletin

How do Muslims qua Muslims integrate in the US?

Claire L. Adida
University of California, San Diego

David D. Laitin

Stanford University

Marie-anne Valfort
*Paris School of Economics - Paris 1
Pantheon Sorbonne University*

Abstract

Economic research on immigrant integration has recently highlighted the discrimination that Muslim immigrants from Muslim-majority countries face in Western labor markets. However, economists are still struggling to determine whether this is due to these immigrants' religion or simply their region of origin. Our objective is to isolate the religious effect from potential confounds in the context of Muslim integration in the United States. Relying on a unique survey which allows us to hold the region of origin of the immigrant constant (Arab countries) while letting religion vary (Christian versus Muslim), we investigate how Muslims qua Muslims integrate in the US. Our results are consistent with those previously reported in other contexts. Both culturally and economically, Muslims perceive more discrimination from the host society and integrate less than do their Christian counterparts, with no improvement with the time these immigrants spend in the US.

1. Introduction

There is widespread evidence that, relative to their host populations, Muslim immigrants from Muslim-majority countries face systematic discrimination in Western labor markets. In France, Duguet, Leandri, L'Horty and Petit (2010) show that callback rates received by applicants with North African sounding names are much lower than those received by applicants with French sounding names. North African applicants are also found to be discriminated against in Belgium (Nayer and Smeesters (1998)), the Netherlands (Bovenkerk, Gras and Ramsoedh (1995) and Blommaert, Coenders and van Tubergen (2013)), and Spain (Actis, Angel de Prada and Pereda (1996)). In Sweden, Carlsson and Rooth (2007), Carlsson (2010) and Rooth (2010) identify substantial discrimination against applicants with Middle Eastern sounding names (relative to applicants with Swedish sounding names). Goldberg and Mourinho (1996) as well as Kass and Manger (2012) show that applicants with Turkish sounding names are discriminated against in the German labor market (relative to applicants with German sounding names). Such discrimination is not confined to Western European countries. In Australia, Booth, Leigh and Varganova (2012) find that applicants with Middle-Eastern names are discriminated against relative to applicants with Anglo-Saxon names.

Yet, this research is not clear on the source of discrimination against Muslim immigrants from Muslim-majority countries. Indeed, this discrimination may be due to religion (i.e. Islam differs from Christianity, the religious tradition of the host population in Western countries) or to region of origin (i.e. Muslim-majority countries typically hail from non-Western regions). Even research that attempts to identify the impact of September 11 on labor market outcomes for Muslims living in the US has failed to disentangle religion from region of origin. For instance, Davila and Mora (2005) examine whether the wages of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries declined between 2000 and 2002. Since their data confound immigrants' religion and region of origin, the 9/11 impact cannot be attributed to one more than the other. Similarly, Kaushal, Kaestner, and Reimers (2007) analyze the impact of September 11 on employment, earnings, and residential mobility of immigrants from countries with "predominantly Arab or Muslim populations". Again, this data-constrained approach cannot isolate a religious effect.

Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2010) offer one exception. These authors conduct a correspondence test in France in which they hold the region of origin of the applicants constant, while allowing their religion to vary. They compare the job-interview callback rates received by two French nationals of Senegalese background who differ only on religion. Their findings reveal a remarkable religious effect: the Muslim applicant is 2.5 times less likely to be contacted by the recruiter than is her Christian counterpart. Relying on a survey conducted among Senegalese immigrants in France, Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2014) later show that Muslims integrate culturally less than do Christians and that this difference perpetuates over time (a possible consequence of anti-Muslim discrimination in the French labour market). More

precisely, the authors find that attachment to the host country is lower among Muslims than among Christians while attachment to the country of origin is higher.

In this paper, we contribute to this effort by isolating the religious effect from potential confounds with an analysis of Muslim immigrant integration in the United States. This is a critical objective because identifying why Muslim integration fails determines how we frame the issue and seek solutions. To achieve our goal, we take advantage of a unique dataset, the Detroit Arab American Study, which allows us to hold the region of origin of the immigrant constant (Arab countries) while letting religion vary (Christian *versus* Muslim). Following Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2014), we compare Muslim and Christian immigrants' perceived discrimination from the host society as well as their integration patterns. Our results are consistent with those reported for France: both culturally and economically, Muslims perceive greater discrimination against them and integrate less than do their Christian counterparts; moreover, the gap remains (and even widens) with the time these immigrants spend in the US.

Alas, our data do not permit us to estimate a region of origin effect. We therefore cannot estimate whether religion or region of origin plays a larger role in accounting for the relative integration failure of Muslims from Muslim-majority countries. In order to answer this question, one would need to compare Muslim immigrants from Arab countries to those from Western countries. This type of data would allow us to hold constant the religion of Muslim immigrants and analyze how they would fare if they originated from Western rather than non-Western countries.[1]

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our survey data. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our results. Finally, section 5 summarizes our conclusions and opens avenues for future research.

2. Data

The Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS) is a research project led by scholars at the University of Michigan. It was conducted in 2003 among a sample of 1,016 first- to third-generation Arab American Muslim and Christian immigrants aged 18 and older and living in the Detroit metropolitan area.[2] The purpose of this survey was to analyze Arab Americans'

---

[1]Relying on the European Social Survey, Adida Laitin and Valfort (2015) perform such an analysis. Their findings suggest that religion rather than region of origin explains discrimination against Muslim immigrants from Muslim-majority countries in Europe. More precisely, they find that these immigrants face the same level of discrimination whether their country of origin is in Europe, Middle East North Africa, Asia-Pacific, or sub-Saharan Africa.

[2]We define a first-generation migrant as someone who was not born in the US (and whose parents were not born in the US either), but who now lives in this country. We call a second-generation migrant someone born in the US, with at least one parent born abroad. We define a third-generation migrant as someone who was born in the US and whose two parents were also born in the US. (We do not have data on the grandparents of the respondents).

attitudes and experiences since September 11.[3] Surprisingly, we are the first to rely on this survey to isolate a religious effect by comparing the answers of Muslim and Christian immigrants originating from the same region of origin (Middle East/North Africa).

Among the original sample, 952 respondents report their religion, their country of birth as well as their parents' country of birth. They are 41% Muslim (59% Christian).[4]

Fifteen questions allow us to measure the respondent's perceived discrimination from the host society (see Panel A, Table 1). Moreover, the DAAS permits us to measure the respondent's cultural integration in the US. Following Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann (2009), we measure the degree of cultural integration by the immigrant's level of attachment to the region of origin and to the host country. Integration is achieved when immigrants show attachment to both their region of origin and host country. However, separation occurs when immigrants' attachment to their region of origin is not accompanied by their attachment to the host country. Fourteen questions allow us to measure the respondent's attachment to her region of origin (see Panel B, Table 1) and seven questions allow us to measure her attachment to the US (see Panel C, Table 1). Finally, we measure the respondent's degree of economic integration with the probability that he or she is unemployed or inactive at the time of the interview (see Panel D, Table 1). This variable is equal to 0 if the respondent is employed and 1 if she is unemployed or inactive. Indeed, discrimination may not only prevent people actively looking for a job from finding one (i.e. the unemployed). It may also increase their probability of being "inactive" by encouraging them to exit the labor force, either to pursue further education or vocational training to improve their job opportunities, or to simply abandon their search for a job (by becoming a home-maker, retiring earlier, ...).[5] We also add in Panel D a question that captures whether the respondent has experienced a loss of employment (due to their race, ethnicity, or religion).

---

[3]More information on this dataset is available at https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/04413. We thank Amaney Jamal for sharing these data with us. The question arises whether Detroit is representative of the US Arab American population. As presented by Howell and Jamal (2009, 69-71), and relying on surveys of Arab Americans conducted in 2000 and 2002 by Zogby International, Detroit was chosen not because it was typical, but rather because it was exceptional. Indeed, 35% of Detroit's population is Arab American; no other city has a comparable concentration of Arab Americans. Moreover, Detroit Arabs are less well-educated and poorer than Arab Americans nationally: only 72% of Detroit's Arabs have high school degrees, compared with 88% nationally; only 23% of Detroit's Arabs have an advanced degree while 43% of Arabs do nationally; 25% of Detroit's Arabs report annual income greater than $100,000 compared with 36% nationally; 24% have an income of less than $20,000 compared with 7% nationally. Yet, this lack of representativeness of Arab Americans living in the Detroit area does not necessarily mean that we lack representativeness when we compare integration patterns between Christians and Muslims in that area. Additionally, there is no equivalent Arab American Study in other US cities. We therefore see our study as a possible bellwether of the differences in integration patterns between Muslim and Christian Arab-Americans in the US, although we acknowledge that further research is needed to determine its representativeness.

[4]As recommended in the codebook for the Detroit Arab American Study, all the descriptive statistics and regression analyses presented in this paper are obtained by using sampling weights that incorporate sample selection, nonresponse and post-stratification factors.

[5]Note that our results hold if we exclude individuals enrolled in an education program.

Our analysis includes controls for the respondent's gender, age, education level, household income, household size, and whether s/he is a second- or third- rather than a first-generation immigrant. Table 2 reports summary statistics for these socioeconomic variables. It is necessary to control for these characteristics since the DAAS does not inform us on whether Arab American Muslims and Arab American Christians are identical upon arrival to the US on all fronts except their religion. If they differ on these initial characteristics, we cannot attribute differences in perceived discrimination from the host society and differences in integration patterns to differences in religion only. Controlling for the respondent's socioeconomic background mitigates the threat of confounding factors. But it also runs against us finding a "Muslim effect". Indeed, as is apparent in Table 2, Arab American Muslims are less educated and poorer than are Arab American Christians. This difference could be due in part to discrimination against Arab American Muslims. If so, controlling for differences in education and income neutralizes part of the Muslim effect we are seeking to estimate.[6]

3. Empirical strategy

We first test whether Arab American Muslims and Christians differ with respect to their perception of discrimination from the host society, as well as their cultural and economic integration. To do so, we estimate Equation (1):

$$y^* = a + b.\mathrm{M} + c.\mathrm{SecondThird} + \mathbf{X}'\mathbf{d}. + \mathbf{\Gamma}'\mathbf{e} + \epsilon, \tag{1}$$

where y^* is the latent continuous metric underlying the respondent's binary or categorical answer, which we denote by y, to one of the questions above. The dummy M is equal to 1 if the respondent is an Arab American Muslim and to 0 if the respondent is an Arab American Christian. Therefore, coefficient b captures the difference in y^* between Arab American Muslims and Arab American Christians. The dummy SecondThird is equal to 1 if the respondent is a second- or third-generation immigrant, and 0 if she is a first-generation immigrant. We also control for $\mathbf{X}$, a vector of socioeconomic characteristics of the respondent (her gender, age, education, household income and household size). Finally, we introduce $\mathbf{\Gamma}$, a vector of country of origin fixed effects.[7] We assume that ϵ, the disturbance term, has a

---

[6]At the same time, we recognize that this purely observational study possibly suffers from omitted variable bias. Yet, in a world where religion cannot be randomly assigned to actual people, and in the absence of a natural experiment, our approach comes closest to identifying a Muslim effect.

[7]When the respondent is a third-generation migrant, her country of origin is the US given that the DAAS does not inform us on the country of birth of the respondent's grandparents. When the respondent is a second-generation migrant, this country of origin is the country of birth of her father (which usually coincides with the country of birth of her mother). Note that our results remain unchanged if we define the country of origin of second-generation migrants based on their mother's country of birth. Note as well that, in eleven of the sixteen countries of origin in our sample (encompassing more than 90% of the respondents), variation in religion is substantial with at least 10% of the respondents affiliated with one religion or the other. The estimates reported in Section 4 persist if we discard the few countries of origin showing low variation across religion (results available upon request).

standard Normal distribution ($\epsilon \sim N(0,1)$).

We then compare the generational change in perceived discrimination from the host society and in cultural and economic integration of Arab American Muslims and Christians. To do so, we estimate Equation (2):

$$y^* = a + b.\mathrm{M} + c.\mathrm{M.SecondThird} + d.\mathrm{SecondThird} + \mathbf{X'e}. + \mathbf{\Gamma'f} + \epsilon, \tag{2}$$

Variables y^*, M and SecondThird, vectors $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{\Gamma}$, and the disturbance term ϵ are defined as in Equation (1). Coefficient b captures the difference in y^* between first-generation Arab American Muslim and Christian immigrants. The sum of coefficients b and c captures the difference in y^* between second- or third-generation Arab American Muslim and Christian immigrants. Therefore, coefficient c (the coefficient of the interaction term M.SecondThird) measures whether the difference in y^* between Arab American Muslims and Christians has increased, decreased or remained unchanged across first and second-/third-generation immigrants.

An alternative to our empirical strategy would consist in focusing only on first-generation Arab American Muslim and Christian immigrants and examining the impact of the time elapsed since their arrival in the US. But we would question the validity of those results, which could be driven by a "dynamic selection bias", whereby differences in integration skills of Arab American Christians and Muslims who decide to migrate to the US vary with their time of arrival. For instance, there is the possibility that Arab American Muslims who arrived earlier initially showed lower integration skills as compared to their Christian counterparts than did Arab American Muslims who arrived later. In this case, we would observe that the time elapsed since arrival in the US coincides with an exacerbation of the difference in integration between Arab American Christians and Muslims. However, this would not necessarily capture the causal impact of the time spent in the US. It would simply reflect the fact that differences in integration skills between Arab American Muslims and Christians vary with their date of arrival in the host country.

Instead of comparing different groups of first-generation immigrants based on their date of arrival in the US, we compare first- with second- and third- generation immigrants. To be sure, second- and third-generation immigrants are likely to be descendants of first-generation immigrants who arrived before those first-generation immigrants surveyed by the DAAS. This premise is confirmed in the DAAS by the fact that the ages of first- and second-/third-generation immigrants are about the same. In this context, if the parents/grandparents of second-/third-generation immigrants arrived in the US with integration skills different from the integration skills of the first-generation immigrants surveyed by the DAAS, meaning that a dynamic selection bias exists, our approach would still not allow us to fully identify the effect. Indeed, cultural values are transmitted from one generation to another. Still,

to the extent that such cultural transmission from one generation to another is partial, we maintain that comparing the different generations of immigrants remains more promising than comparing groups of first-generation immigrants who settled at different times.[8] We have reason to believe that this is the case. Indeed, children's values are not only inherited from their parents; they are also shaped by the host country environment.[9] In sum, as in previous studies,[10] our approach is not a panacea in that it does not allow us to completely solve the dynamic selection bias if it exists. Nonetheless, it does allow us to mitigate it.

4. Results

We present our results in Tables 3 to 6. These results are estimated via a weighted (ordered) probit analysis. This analysis allows us to compute the probabilities that y is equal to its different values and therefore the expected value of y, for different values of the independent variables in Equation (1) and Equation (2).[11]

For all three tables, column (2) reports the difference in average answers provided by Arab American Muslims and Christians, pooling across all generations of immigrants. It reveals a difference between Arab American Muslims and Christians that indicates lower integration for Muslims; this difference is statistically significant at conventional confidence levels for 27 of our 38 tests.[12] More precisely, it highlights four clear patterns. First, Arab American Muslims are more likely to perceive discrimination from the host society than are Arab American Christians (Table 3). Second, they are more attached to their region of origin (Table 4). Third, they are less attached to their host country (Table 5). Finally, Arab American Muslims integrate less well economically than do Arab American Christians (Table 6).

Columns (3) and (4) reveal additional results. They report differences between Arab American Muslims and Christians conditional on whether they are first- (column (3)) or second-/third-generation immigrants (column (4)). Columns (3) and (4) show that, in the

---

[8]Focusing on different generations of immigrants also avoids any confound between the "time spent in the host country" and the "age" effects. Indeed, first- and second-/third- generation immigrants are already, on average, the same age. By contrast, the time elapsed since arrival of first-generation immigrants in the US is strongly correlated with their age. This is problematic if age has a differential impact on immigrants' integration skills for Muslims and Christians. For instance, it may be the case that Arab American Muslims become more attached than do Arab American Christians to their country of origin as they age, irrespective of the US context. If so, we run the risk of wrongly interpreting these different age effects as evidence that the time Arab American Muslim and Christian immigrants spend in the US generates a divergence in their integration patterns.

[9]See for instance Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and Voors et al. (2012) for evidence that context shapes individuals' values.

[10]See for instance Bisin et al. (2008), Algan et al. (2010) and Giavazzi, Petkov and Schiantarelli (2014).

[11]To compute these probabilities, we rely on the `prvalue` command in Stata 13.

[12]These results persist if we control for the employment status of the respondent, which suggests that they are not merely driven by labour market outcomes.

majority of instances, the significant differences we have identified between Arab American Muslims and Christians hold for both first-generation immigrants and second-/third-generation immigrants.

Finally, in column (5), we report whether and how the differences we observe between Arab American Muslims and Christians change from one generation to another. We find a significant change in only 6 cases. Moreover, in 5 of those 6 cases, we find that the difference in perceived discrimination and integration patterns between Arab American Muslims and Christians *increases* from one generation to another. Indeed, relative to their Christian counterparts, second-/third-generation Muslim immigrants are less likely than first-generation Muslim immigrants to read newspapers in Arabic but they are more likely to: (i) agree that their co-religionists are not respected by American society; (ii) look guarded, nervous or suspicious about the interview; (iii) consider it important to speak Arabic; (iv) consider it important to visit one's family's country of ancestry; (v) have experienced a loss of employment (due to their race, ethnicity, or religion).[13] There is no easy answer to explain the growing advantage in integrative success of Arab American Christians compared to Muslims from one generation to the next. With similar results in the context of Europe, Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2016) report on a self-reinforcing logic of discrimination against Muslims that is absent with matched Christians. We suspect a similar dynamic in the US, though future research would need to demonstrate this.[14]

5. Conclusion

Relying on a unique dataset which allows us to hold the region of origin of the immigrant constant (Arab countries) while letting religion vary (Christian versus Muslim), we investigate how Muslims *qua* Muslims integrate in the US relative to Christians. Our results are consistent with those reported in other contexts: both culturally and economically, Muslims perceive more discrimination from the host society and integrate less than do their Christian counterparts, with no improvement over two or three generations. Understanding the mechanism(s) behind this Muslim effect constitutes a critical step toward policy recommendations aiming to improve the fate of Muslim immigrants in Christian-heritage societies.

---

[13]It is important to stress that these results are robust to imputing missing data due to missing information on the controls used in Equations (1) and (2). This imputation procedure in fact strengthens our results. The difference between Arab American Muslims and Christians becomes statistically significant for item (15) in Table 3 and item (10) in Table 4. Moreover, the increase in this difference from one generation to another becomes statistically significant for item (1) in Table 3 and item (9) in Table 4.

[14]Note that, throughout our analysis, the country of origin fixed effects are rarely statistically significant and not consistently so across our dependent variables. This is not surprising given that we focus on countries that are all located in the same region (Middle East North Africa). In any case, this result is in line with Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2015)'s conclusion according to which religion rather than region of origin explains discrimination against Muslim immigrants from Muslim-majority countries now living in the West.

References

[1] Actis W., M. Angel de Prada and C. Pereda. 1996. "Labor market discrimination against migrant workers in Spain." *International Migration Papers* 9, International Labour Organization, Geneva.

[2] Adida, Claire L., David D. Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort. 2010. "Identifying barriers to Muslim integration in France." *PNAS* 107(52): 384-390.

[3] Adida, Claire L., David D. Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort. 2014. "Muslims in France: identifying a discriminatory equilibrium." *Journal of Population Economics* 27(4): 1039-1086.

[4] Adida, Claire L., David D. Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort. 2015. "Region of origin or religion? Understanding why immigrants from Muslim-majority countries are discriminated against in Western Europe." Working paper.

[5] Adida, Claire L., David D. Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort. 2016. *Why Muslim integration fails in Christian-heritage societies.* Harvard University Press.

[6] Algan, Yann, Christian Dustmann, Albrecht Glitz and Alan Manning. 2010. "The economic situation of first- and second-generation immigrants in France, Germany, and the UK." *Economic Journal* 120 (542), F4-F30.

[7] Bisin, Alberto, Eleonora Patacchini, Thierry A. Verdier and Yves Zenou. 2008. "Are Muslim immigrants different in terms of cultural integration?" *Journal of the European Economic Association* 6(2-3): 445-456.

[8] Blommaert, Lieselotte, Marcel Coenders and Frank van Tubergen. 2013. "Discrimination of Arabic-named applicants in the Netherlands: an internet-based field experiment examining different phases in online recruitment procedures." *Social Forces* 92(3): 957-982.

[9] Booth, Alison L., Andrew Leigh and Elena Varganova. 2012. "Does ethnic discrimination vary across minority groups? Evidence from a field experiment." *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 74(4): 547-573.

[10] Bovenkerk, F., M. J. I. Gras and D. Ramsoedh. 1995. "Discrimination against migrant workers and ethnic minorities in access to employment in the Netherlands." *International Migration Papers* 4, International Labour Organization, Geneva.

[11] Carlsson, Magnus. 2010. "Experimental evidence of discrimination in the hiring of first- and second-generation immigrants." *Labor. Review of Labor Economics and Industrial Relations* 24(3): 263-278.

[12] Carlsson, Magnus and Dan-Olof Rooth. 2007. "Evidence of ethnic discrimination in the Swedish labor market using experimental data." *Labor Economics* 14(4): 716-729.

[13] Constant, Amelie F., Liliya Gataullina and Klaus F. Zimmermann. 2009. "Ethnosizing immigrants." *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 69(3): 274-287.

[14] Davila, Alberto and Marie T. Mora. 2005. "Changes in the earnings of Arab men in the US between 2000 and 2002." *Journal of Population Economics* 18(4): 587-601.

[15] Duguet, Emmanuel, Noam Leandri, Yannick L'Horty and Pascale Petit. 2010. "Are young French jobseekers of ethnic immigrant origin discriminated against? A controlled experiment in the Paris area." *Annals of Economics and Statistics* 99-100: 187-215.

[16] Giavazzi, Francesco, Ivan Petkov and Fabio Schiantarelli. 2014. "Culture: persistence and evolution." Working Paper 20174, National Bureau of Economic Research.

[17] Goldberg A. and D. Mourinho. 1996. "Labor market discrimination against foreign workers in Germany." *International Migration Papers* 7, International Labor Office, Geneva.

[18] Howell, Sally and Amaney Jamal. 2009. "The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks," in *Citizenship and crisis: Arab Detroit after 9/11*, by W. Baker et al. Russell Sage Foundation: New York.

[19] Kaas, Leo and Christian Manger. 2012. "Ethnic discrimination in Germany's labor market: a field experiment." *German Economic Review* 13(1): 1-20.

[20] Kaushal, Neeraj, Robert Kaestner and Cordelia Reimers. 2007. "Labor market effects of September 11th on Arab and Muslim residents of the United States." *Journal of Human Resources* 42(2): 275-308.

[21] Nayer A. and B. Smeesters. 1998. "La discrimination à l'accès à l'emploi en raison de l'origine étrangère: le cas de la Belgique." *Cahiers des migrations internationales* 23, International Labour Organization, Geneva.

[22] Nunn Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review* 101(7): 3221-3252.

[23] Rooth, Dan-Olof. 2010. "Automatic associations and discrimination in hiring: real world evidence." *Labor Economics* 17(3): 523-534.

[24] Voors, Maarten J., Eleonora E. M. Nillesen, Philip Verwimp, Erwin H. Bulte, Robert Lensink and Daan P. Van Soest. 2012. "Violent conflict and behavior: a field experiment in Burundi." *American Economic Review* 102(2): 941-964.

1 Tables

Table 1: Dependent variables

	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
Panel A: Perceived discrimination from the host society					
(1) Distrust legal: how much the resp. distrusts the US legal system	926	2.12	0.90	1	4
(2) Distrust police: how much the resp. distrusts the local police	944	1.76	0.77	1	4
(3) Distrust Wash: how much the resp. distrusts the government in Washington	901	2.37	0.99	1	4
(4) Biased news: how much the resp. considers that news coverage of Arab Americans is biased	915	2.35	0.55	1	3
(5) No respect Arab-Am.: how much the resp. agrees that Arab Americans are not respected by the American society	675	3.11	1.06	1	5
(6) No respect co-rel.: how much the resp. agrees that co-religionists are not respected by the American society	943	2.67	1.14	1	5
(7) Verbal insult: whether the resp. has experienced verbal insults (due to her race, ethnicity, or religion)	951	0.23	0.42	0	1
(8) Threat: whether the resp. has experienced threatening words (due to her race, ethnicity, or religion)	951	0.13	0.34	0	1
(9) Physical attack: whether the resp. has experienced physical attack (due to her race, ethnicity, or religion)	950	0.02	0.13	0	1
(10) Vandalism: whether the resp. has experienced vandalism (due to her race, ethnicity, or religion)	951	0.04	0.20	0	1
(11) Land of opp.: how much the resp. disagrees with the fact that the US is a land of opportunity	946	1.73	0.87	1	5
(12) Bad exp.: whether the resp. has had a bad experience after 9/11	947	0.16	0.36	0	1
(13) Not at home: how much the resp. does not feel at home in the US	944	1.74	0.85	1	5
(14) Feeling change: whether the feeling of not being at home in the US has changed since 9/11	938	0.25	0.43	0	1
(15) Suspicion: how much the resp. seemed guarded, nervous, or suspicious about the interview	928	1.55	0.83	1	4
Panel B: Attachment to the region of origin					
(1) Arab race: whether the resp. reports to be Arab rather than White or of any other race[i]	946	0.31	0.46	0	1
(2) Arabic TV: whether the resp. watches any TV news broadcast in Arabic	844	0.64	0.48	0	1
(3) Arabic radio: whether the resp. listens to radio news in Arabic	536	0.37	0.48	0	1
(4) Arabic newspaper: whether the resp. reads any newspaper in Arabic	530	0.33	0.47	0	1
(5) Arabic internet: whether the resp. reads any news item in Arabic on the Internet	340	0.27	0.45	0	1
(6) Imp. speaking Arabic: how important it is for the resp. to speak Arabic	914	3.39	0.92	1	4
(7) Imp. marrying an Arab person: how important it is for the resp. to marry someone of Arab background	894	3.31	1.04	1	4
(8) Imp. visiting home: how important it is for the resp. to visit one's family's country of ancestry	890	2.99	1.17	1	4
(9) Arabic at home: whether the resp. speaks Arabic at home (in addition to English)	944	0.86	0.35	0	1
(10) Listening proficiency in Arabic: how well the resp. is able to listen to radio and television news in Arabic	661	3.55	0.78	1	4
(11) Reading proficiency in Arabic: how well the resp. is able to read newspapers and magazines in Arabic	661	3.08	1.18	1	4
(12) Writing proficiency in Arabic: how well the resp. is able to write a letter in formal Arabic	661	2.96	1.21	1	4
(13) Speaking proficiency in Arabic: how well the resp. is able to talk with Arabic-speaking friends and family in Arabic	662	3.74	0.54	1	4
(14) Arab spouse: whether the respondent's spouse/partner is of Arab origin	686	0.91	0.29	0	1

Table 1 (continued): Dependent variables

	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
Panel C: Attachment to the US					
(1) White race: whether the resp. reports to be White rather than Arab or of any other race[i]	946	0.64	0.48	0	1
(2) National/local news on TV: whether the resp. watches the national and/or local news on TV	844	0.87	0.33	0	1
(3) American spouse: whether the respondent's spouse/partner is of American origin	686	0.02	0.16	0	1
(4) Speaking proficiency in English: how well the resp. is able to speak English	756	3.22	0.86	1	4
(5) Reading proficiency in English: how well the resp. is able to read English	950	3.23	0.95	1	4
(6) Writing proficiency in English: how well the resp. is able to write English	951	3.15	0.98	1	4
(7) Proud: how proud the resp. is to be American	915	3.58	0.63	1	4
Panel D: Economic integration					
(1) Unemployed/inactive *versus* employed	934	0.40	0.49	0	1
(2) Emp. loss: whether the resp. has experienced loss of employment (due to her race, ethnicity, or religion)	948	0.04	0.19	0	1

Notes: Values for the means and standard deviations are obtained by using sampling weights.
[i]: These other races are: "Black African American or Negro", "American Indian or Alaska native", "Asian" and "Pacific Islander".

Table 2: Socioeconomic characteristics of Arab American Muslims and Christians

	Arab American Muslims (a)	Arab American Christians (b)	Difference (b)-(a)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
(1) Female (binary)	0.50	0.56	0.06*
(2) Age (number of years elapsed since the respondent's birth)	37.86	45.56	7.70***
(3) Education (from 1 to 9)	3.55	3.85	0.30**
(4) Household income (from 1 to 10)	4.57	5.78	1.21***
(5) Household size (number of individuals living in the household)	4.82	4.07	-0.75***
(6) Second-/third generation immigrant (binary)	0.15	0.32	0.17***

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the weighted mean value for Arab American Muslims and Christians respectively. Column 3 reports the difference between the weighted mean values in columns 1 and 2. "Female" is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent is female and the value 0 otherwise. "Age" is equal to the age of the respondent. "Education" is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than high school) to 9 (doctorate degree). "Household income" is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than 10,000 USD in 2002) to 10 (200,000 USD or more in 2002). "Household size" is equal to the number of individuals living in the household, children included. "Second-/third generation immigrant" is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent is a second- or third-generation immigrant and the value 0 if she is a first-generation immigrant. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence levels.

Table 3: Comparing perceived discrimination of Arab American Muslims and Christians by the host society

	Obs.	All	1st gen. (a)	2nd or 3rd gen. (b)	Evolution (b)-(a)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Distrust legal: how much the resp. distrusts the US legal system (from 1 to 4)	N=771	2.15-2.14 = 0.01	2.06-2.09 = -0.03	2.41-2.27 = 0.14	+0.17
(2) Distrust police: how much the resp. distrusts the local police (from 1 to 4)	N=780	1.84-1.68 = 0.16*	1.80-1.66 = 0.14	1.99-1.76 = 0.23	+0.09
(3) Distrust Wash: how much the resp. distrusts the government in Washington (from 1 to 4)	N=750	2.59-2.30 = 0.29***	2.50-2.28 = 0.22*	2.86-2.38 = 0.48***	+0.26
(4) Biased news: how much the resp. considers that news coverage of Arab Americans is biased (from 1 to 3)	N=763	2.62-2.22 = 0.40***	2.60-2.18 = 0.42***	2.65-2.32 = 0.33***	-0.09
(5) No respect Arab-Am.: how much the resp. agrees that Arab Americans are not respected by the American society (from 1 to 5)	N=563	3.25-2.97 = 0.28*	3.15-2.94 = 0.21	3.64-3.08 = 0.56***	+0.35
(6) No respect co-rel.: how much the resp. agrees that co-religionists are not respected by the American society (from 1 to 5)	N=778	3.21-2.29 = 0.92***	3.12-2.34 = 0.78***	3.65-2.21 = 1.44***	**+0.66***
(7) Verbal insult: whether the resp. has experienced verbal insults (binary)	N=785	0.20-0.20 = 0.00	0.18-0.18 = 0.00	0.26-0.26 = 0.00	0.00
(8) Threat: whether the resp. has experienced threatening words (binary)	N=785	0.10-0.09 = 0.01	0.08-0.08 = 0.00	0.16-0.14 = 0.02	+0.02
(9) Physical attack: whether the resp. has experienced physical attack (binary)	N=784	0.00-0.00 = 0.00	0.00-0.00 = 0.00	0.00-0.00 = 0.00	0.00

Table 3 (continued): Comparing perceived discrimination of Arab American Muslims and Christians by the host society

	Obs.	All	1st gen. (a)	2nd or 3rd gen. (b)	Evolution (b)-(a)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(10) Vandalism: whether the resp. has experienced vandalism (binary)	N=785	0.01-0.01 = 0.00	0.01-0.01 = 0.00	0.01-0.01 = 0.00	0.00
(11) Land of opp.: how much the resp. disagrees with the fact that the US is a land of equal opportunity (from 1 to 5)	N=781	1.85-1.59 = 0.26***	1.78-1.56 = 0.22**	2.05-1.70 = 0.35*	+0.13
(12) Bad exp.: whether the resp. has had a bad experience after 9/11 (binary)	N=782	0.19-0.10 = 0.09**	0.19-0.10 = 0.09**	0.20-0.10 = 0.10	+0.01
(13) Not at home: how much the resp. does not feel at home in the US (from 1 to 5)	N=780	1.85-1.58 = 0.27***	1.94-1.69 = 0.25**	1.67-1.36 = 0.31**	+0.06
(14) Feeling change: whether the feeling of not being at home in the US has changed since 9/11 (binary)	N=776	0.32-0.20 = 0.12**	0.31-0.20 = 0.11*	0.33-0.20 = 0.13	+0.02
(15) Suspicion: how much the resp. seemed guarded, nervous, or suspicious about the interview (from 1 to 4)	N=774	1.50-1.38 = 0.12	1.53-1.45 = 0.08	1.54-1.20 = 0.34***	**+0.26****

Notes: This table is based on (ordered) probit estimates of Equation (1) and Equation (2). Column (2) reports the difference in average answers provided by Arab American Muslims and Christians, pooling across all generations of immigrants. We obtain this difference by computing from Equation (1) the difference between the expected value of y when M is equal to 1 and when M is equal to 0, with all other controls set at their mean. Columns (3) and (4) report differences between Arab American Muslims and Christians conditional on whether they are first- (column (3)) or second-/third-generation immigrants (column (4)). These differences are obtained from Equation (2). In column (3), we compute the difference between the expected value of y when M is equal to 1, M.SecondThird is equal to 0 and SecondThird is equal to 0 and the expected value of y when M is equal to 0, M.SecondThird is equal to 0 and SecondThird is equal to 0, setting all other controls at their mean. In column (4), we compute the difference between the expected value of y when M is equal to 1, M.SecondThird is equal to 1 and SecondThird is equal to 1 and the expected value of y when M is equal to 0, M.SecondThird is equal to 0 and SecondThird is equal to 1, setting all other controls at their mean. Finally, column (5) reports whether and how this difference changes from one generation to another. We control in columns (2) to (5) for the respondent's gender, age, education level, household income and household size. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence levels.

Table 4: Comparing attachment of Arab American Muslims and Christians to their region of origin

	Obs.	All	1st gen. (a)	2nd or 3rd gen. (b)	Evolution (b)-(a)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Arab race: whether the resp. reports to be Arab rather than White or of any other race (binary)[i]	N=780	0.37-0.21 = 0.16***	0.33-0.21 = 0.12**	0.51-0.22 = 0.29***	+0.17
(2) Arabic TV: whether the resp. watches any TV news broadcast in Arabic (binary)	N=693	0.81-0.54 = 0.27***	0.88-0.63 = 0.25***	0.54-0.30 = 0.24**	-0.01
(3) Arabic radio: whether the resp. listens to radio news in Arabic (binary)	N=441	0.35-0.21 = 0.14*	0.48-0.31 = 0.17	0.10-0.07 = 0.03	-0.14
(4) Arabic newspaper: whether the resp. reads any newspaper in Arabic (binary)	N=436	0.37-0.14 = 0.23***	0.59-0.25 = 0.34***	0.03-0.04 = -0.01	**-0.35****
(5) Arabic internet: whether the resp. reads any news item in Arabic on the Internet (binary)	N=284	0.02-0.00 = 0.02*	0.06-0.01 = 0.05**	0.00-0.00 = 0.00	-0.05
(6) Imp. speaking arabic: how important it is for the resp. to speak Arabic (from 1 to 4)	N=757	3.56-3.33 = 0.23**	3.59-3.49 = 0.10	3.56-2.88 = 0.68***	**+0.58*****
(7) Imp. marrying an Arab person: how important it is for the resp. to marry someone of Arab background (from 1 to 4)	N=738	3.50-3.22 = 0.28**	3.54-3.35 = 0.19*	3.40-2.86 = 0.54**	+0.35
(8) Imp. visiting home: how important it is for the resp. to visit one's family's country of ancestry (from 1 to 4)	N=735	3.07-3.03 = 0.04	3.15-3.19 = -0.04	2.91-2.58 = 0.33	**+0.37***
(9) Arabic at home: whether the resp. speaks Arabic at home (in addition to English) (binary)	N=779	0.98-0.91 = 0.07***	0.99-0.96 = 0.03***	0.84-0.54 = 0.30***	+0.27

Table 4 (continued): Comparing attachment of Arab American Muslims and Christians to their region of origin

	Obs.	All	1st gen. (a)	2nd or 3rd gen. (b)	Evolution (b)-(a)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(10) Listening proficiency in Arabic: how well the resp. is able		3.76-3.68	3.84-3.79	2.74-2.56	
	N=547	=	=	=	+0.13
to listen to radio and television news in Arabic (from 1 to 4)		0.08	0.05	0.18	
(11) Reading proficiency in Arabic: how well the resp. is able		3.34-3.20	3.51-3.41	1.93-1.72	
	N=547	=	=	=	+0.11
to read newspapers and magazines in Arabic (from 1 to 4)		0.14	0.10	0.21	
(12) Writing proficiency in Arabic: how well the resp. is able		3.16-3.04	3.36-3.29	1.74-1.43	
	N=547	=	=	=	+0.24
to write a letter in formal Arabic (from 1 to 4)		0.12	0.07	0.31	
(13) Speaking proficiency in Arabic: how well the resp. is able		3.91-3.81	3.95-3.83	3.48-3.26	
	N=548	=	=	=	+0.10
to talk with Arabic-speaking friends and family in Arabic (from 1 to 4)		0.10**	0.12***	0.22	
(14) Arab spouse: whether the respondent's spouse/partner		0.98-0.93	0.99-0.95	0.95-0.81	
	N=581	=	=	=	+0.10
is of Arab origin (binary)		0.05***	0.04***	0.14**	

Notes: This table is based on (ordered) probit estimates of Equation (1) and Equation (2). Column (2) reports the difference in average answers provided by Arab American Muslims and Christians, pooling across all generations of immigrants. We obtain this difference by computing from Equation (1) the difference between the expected value of y when M is equal to 1 and when M is equal to 0, with all other controls set at their mean. Columns (3) and (4) report differences between Arab American Muslims and Christians conditional on whether they are first- (column (3)) or second-/third-generation immigrants (column (4)). These differences are obtained from Equation (2). In column (3), we compute the difference between the expected value of y when M is equal to 1, M.SecondThird is equal to 0 and SecondThird is equal to 0 and the expected value of y when M is equal to 0, M.SecondThird is equal to 0 and SecondThird is equal to 0, setting all other controls at their mean. In column (4), we compute the difference between the expected value of y when M is equal to 1, M.SecondThird is equal to 1 and SecondThird is equal to 1 and the expected value of y when M is equal to 0, M.SecondThird is equal to 0 and SecondThird is equal to 1, setting all other controls at their mean. Finally, column (5) reports whether and how this difference changes from one generation to another. We control in columns (2) to (5) for the respondent's gender, age, education level, household income and household size. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence levels.

[i]: it is important to stress that Arab American Muslims are more likely to report to be Arab rather than White or of any other race, although their complexion (from very dark to very light) is not reported to be different from the complexion of Arab American Christians by the interviewer.

Table 5: Comparing attachment of Arab American Muslims and Christians to the US

	Obs.	All	1st gen. (a)	2nd or 3rd gen. (b)	Evolution (b)-(a)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) White race: whether the resp. reports to be White rather than Arab or of any other race (binary)	N=780	0.56-0.76 = -0.20***	0.57-0.75 = -0.18***	0.48-0.76 = -0.28***	-0.10
(2) National/local news on TV: whether the resp. watches the national and/or local news on TV (binary)	N=692	0.92-0.97 = -0.05**	0.90-0.96 = -0.06**	0.96-0.99 = -0.03	+0.03
(3) American spouse: whether the respondent's spouse/partner is of American origin (binary)	N=581	0.00-0.00 = 0.00	0.00-0.00 = 0.00	0.00-0.00 = 0.00	0.00
(4) Speaking proficiency in English: how well the resp. is able to speak English (from 1 to 4)	N=628	3.21-3.56 = -0.35***	3.07-3.44 = -0.37***	3.84-3.95 = -0.11	+0.26
(5) Reading proficiency in English: how well the resp. is able to read English (from 1 to 4)	N=783	3.38-3.64 = -0.26***	3.14-3.46 = -0.32***	3.86-3.91 = -0.05	+0.27
(6) Writing proficiency in English: how well the resp. is able to write English (from 1 to 4)	N=784	3.27-3.55 = -0.28***	3.04-3.37 = -0.33***	3.83-3.86 = -0.03	+0.30
(7) Proud: how proud the resp. is to be American (from 1 to 4)	N=758	3.47-3.70 = -0.23***	3.46-3.67 = -0.21***	3.46-3.76 = -0.30***	-0.09

Notes: This table is based on (ordered) probit estimates of Equation (1) and Equation (2). Column (2) reports the difference in average answers provided by Arab American Muslims and Christians, pooling across all generations of immigrants. We obtain this difference by computing from Equation (1) the difference between the expected value of y when M is equal to 1 and when M is equal to 0, with all other controls set at their mean. Columns (3) and (4) report differences between Arab American Muslims and Christians conditional on whether they are first- (column (3)) or second-/third-generation immigrants (column (4)). These differences are obtained from Equation (2). In column (3), we compute the difference between the expected value of y when M is equal to 1, M.SecondThird is equal to 0 and SecondThird is equal to 0 and the expected value of y when M is equal to 0, M.SecondThird is equal to 0 and SecondThird is equal to 0, setting all other controls at their mean. In column (4), we compute the difference between the expected value of y when M is equal to 1, M.SecondThird is equal to 1 and SecondThird is equal to 1 and the expected value of y when M is equal to 0, M.SecondThird is equal to 0 and SecondThird is equal to 1, setting all other controls at their mean. Finally, column (5) reports whether and how this difference changes from one generation to another. We control in columns (2) to (5) for the respondent's gender, age, education level, household income and household size. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence levels.

Table 6: Comparing the economic integration of Arab American Muslims and Christians

	Obs.	All	1st gen. (a)	2nd or 3rd gen. (b)	Evolution (b)-(a)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Unemployed/inactive *versus* employed (binary)	N=770	0.45-0.25 = 0.20***	0.41-0.21 = 0.20***	0.56-0.34 = 0.22*	-0.02
(2) Emp. loss: whether the resp. has experienced a loss of employment (binary)	N=784	0.03-0.00 = 0.03***	0.02-0.00 = 0.02**	0.07-0.00 = 0.07***	**+0.05****

Notes: This table is based on (ordered) probit estimates of Equation (1) and Equation (2). Column (2) reports the difference in average answers provided by Arab American Muslims and Christians, pooling across all generations of immigrants. We obtain this difference by computing from Equation (1) the difference between the expected value of y when M is equal to 1 and when M is equal to 0, with all other controls set at their mean. Columns (3) and (4) report differences between Arab American Muslims and Christians conditional on whether they are first- (column (3)) or second-/third-generation immigrants (column (4)). These differences are obtained from Equation (2). In column (3), we compute the difference between the expected value of y when M is equal to 1, M.SecondThird is equal to 0 and SecondThird is equal to 0 and the expected value of y when M is equal to 0, M.SecondThird is equal to 0 and SecondThird is equal to 0, setting all other controls at their mean. In column (4), we compute the difference between the expected value of y when M is equal to 1, M.SecondThird is equal to 1 and SecondThird is equal to 1 and the expected value of y when M is equal to 0, M.SecondThird is equal to 0 and SecondThird is equal to 1, setting all other controls at their mean. Finally, column (5) reports whether and how this difference changes from one generation to another. We control in columns (2) to (5) for the respondent's gender, age, education level, household income and household size. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence levels.