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| Martin Van der linden |
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| ''Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes'' |
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| Many mechanisms used to select a committee of k members out of a candidates endow voters with some veto power over candidates. Impossibility results are provided showing that, in most cases, even limited veto power implies that the mechanism is not strategy-proof. These impossibilities hold on a large set of domains including the domain of additive preferences and even when probabilistic mechanisms are allowed. |
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| Keywords: Mechanism design, Strategy-proofness, Veto, Probabilistic mechanism, Committee selection |
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
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| Manuscript Received : Sep 19 2016 | | Manuscript Accepted : Sep 21 2016 |
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